Articles- International Relations & Foreign Affairs

Slow But Certain Descent into Chaos

Chinmaya Gharekhan  

Can something be done to prevent a disaster from taking place in and around Syria?

 Is Syria already in the throes of a civil war? What are its implications for the region? Whither Arab Spring? What is the state of play in the Arab League? How is the great game between the Shias and the Sunnis, led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, being played out? How are India's interests affected?

All experts agree that Syria is a pivotal country in the region. Libya, during Muammar Qadhafi's reign, pretended to assert a role for itself beyond its inherent strength. He did manage to buy a few loyal supporters in Africa with his oil money but had no ally in the Arab world. What happened in Libya will not have consequences for others in the region, particularly since the two Arab countries with which it shares borders have already experienced the ‘spring.' Syria, on the other hand, has always been one of the most significant actors in West Asia, with a dynamic, proactive approach. A destabilised Syria will seriously destabilise the neighbours, with far-reaching consequences, some of which might be palatable to some and not so to others. This explains the somewhat “hands-off” attitude of the “international community” so far because it does not know how to deal with the Syrian regime.

 Unlike as in Egypt and Tunisia, the opposition in Syria has not been peaceful or non-violent, almost from the beginning. The protesters have often been well armed in the confrontation with the security forces. More than 3,000 civilians have lost their lives according to the United Nations; a large number of security personnel too, perhaps running into several hundreds, have been killed. A new and potentially ominous — ominous because it brings the country closer to a civil war — development is the defection of some members of the army and their getting organised into an effective force, called the Free Syrian Army, to attack government installations.

The Assad regime was not much worried thus far because the army and the security agencies have been fully behind it. If there is a breach in the ranks of the army and parts of it openly engage in anti-regime violence, the regime can be expected to fight back with full ferocity. It could well be a case of ‘you-ain't-seen-nothing-so-far.' The fact that Turkey, for whatever reasons, is hosting the opposition and offering it assistance not restricted to humanitarian, and Jordan, whose King has openly called upon Mr. Assad to step down, indicates the certainty of external powers getting dragged into the civil war. One can be confident that foreign involvement will not be limited to these two countries. It should not take long for Iran and Saudi Arabia to step in for their own reasons. Lebanon, of course, will be the most adversely affected.

In the event of civil war

Should the situation develop into a full-fledged civil war, it would last a long time. The Lebanese civil war lasted 14 years. The regime will be fighting for survival — political and, crucially, physical. The majority Sunni community, led by the Muslim Brotherhood types, will seek revenge for all the atrocities suffered by them at the hands of the minority Alawite Shia government over the decades. Logic would suggest that Israel, for one, would not welcome the installation of a hard-line, Islamist regime in Damascus, not an unlikely outcome of a civil war. However, for Israel, and hence automatically for the U.S., the highest priority is Iran; if Iran is made to lose its most important ally in the region, it would be worth any price. Iran will lose not only Syria but also access to the Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the political leaders of Hamas, some of whom are reported to have moved to Egypt in recent times. The removal of the Assad regime would be a huge, even if short-term, gain for Israel.

There is one factor which just might be of help to the Assad regime. In case of a civil war, the significant Christian community will also suffer severely, precisely because of its pro-Assad orientation, which in turn is explained by the regime's secular character. Would the western powers wish to encourage such a contingency?

What we are witnessing today is Syria's slow but certain descent into chaos, a process which the world would surely wish to avoid but seems helpless. The international community will say with justification that Mr. Assad was given more than ample opportunity to introduce political and economic reforms which, he says, he has always wanted to and still does. But that was in the past. Can something be done now to prevent a disaster from taking place in and around Syria?

The West and the Arab governments, as well as Turkey, can give Mr. Assad one more opportunity. They can fix a reasonable time frame, not an absurd three or seven days' ultimatum, for him to carry out the reforms. They should at the same time — and this is important — call upon the opposition groups to stop all violence while retaining their right to stage peaceful protests. The Syrian government will definitely strike back in case of any violence anywhere in the country. So it should not be provoked or given an opportunity to justify the use of force. If, at the end of this period, credible reforms have not been implemented, there will likely be more support for sanctions on the regime. The Arab League must not get carried away by its own rhetoric or by the aggressive lobbying of some of its members. It should avoid the temptation of appearing to act tough or “principled,” and delay submitting the matter to the United Nations Security Council. Once the matter goes to the Security Council, the downhill acceleration will not be possible to stop.

The Arab League vote a few days ago —18 in favour of suspending Syria, 3 against and 1 abstention — was most revealing. Syria's own vote against is natural and Yemen's negative vote is easily explainable. Lebanon's opposition to the suspension is indicative of the domestic political set-up in the country; the Hezbollah, primarily a Shia movement, is part of the ruling coalition, with a veto-wielding share in the government. Iraq's abstention is even more significant. A government which owes so much to the U.S. has publicly adopted, in effect, a pro-Assad stance; this has a lot to do with the fact that the government in Baghdad is led by the Shia community. The Shia-Sunni tensions and the consequent Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry are very much a factor in all this drama.

Arab League action

On the other hand, the Arab League action was, no doubt, also influenced by the winds — that have become mild in recent days — that have blown over the Arab world. How can Egypt, recently liberated from an autocratic rule, not oppose an autocratic regime elsewhere?

As for the Arab Spring, the only country where it appears to have blossomed is where it all began — Tunisia. Tunisia has already had its election, in which a ‘moderate' Islamic party has gained the highest vote, not an absolute majority. In Egypt, there are question marks, although it too is heading for an election later this month. The reason for doubts regarding Egypt is that the army is a strong factor — which was not the case in Tunisia — and seems reluctant to give up its privileged position, not least in the economic sphere. It is believed by some that the reason the army did not stand by Hosni Mubarak is that he was grooming his son, a businessman and non-army man, to be his successor.

In the Security Council, the governments define their positions on political considerations, rarely on only merits of the situation. They first decide how to vote and then proceed to find a rationale. Sometimes the situation is so clear-cut that there is no room for any wiggle. Such was the case when Saddam Hussein tried to swallow Kuwait in August 1990. Today's Syrian situation is infinitely more complex.

 What should India do? If the assessment is that Syria is heading for a civil war, a case could be made for abstention, since we would not like to take sides in an internal strife. On the other hand, if the Arab League were to make a formal request for sanctions, it would be difficult for us not to support the consequent action in the Security Council. The people of India rightly want their government to exercise an ‘independent' foreign policy, but ‘independence' should not mean merely a policy different from that of western powers. “Genuine” independence calls for an approach designed to protect and further our interests, irrespective of whom it pleases or displeases. 

India is not a global power

Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

Power in inter-state relations is the capacity as well as the political will to use that capacity, of one country to make another country do something which, left to itself, it would not do or would not want to do. “Soft” power should not be considered a component of the concept of power since it is not relevant to modifying the behaviour of another country; it can and does serve as a model and indirectly — and over a period of time — to earn goodwill among sections of society of other countries for its culture. But it has no place in the discussion of power as a means to bring about a change in the attitude of another country.

India has a genuine attraction for many in the Middle East because of its pluralism combined with a functioning democracy; however, it does not give any “power” to India to influence decision-making in those countries. When we talk of power, we are thinking of military, economic and diplomatic clout, not of Bollywood or yoga.

The 20th century offers many examples of the exercise of power by states mostly in neighbouring countries or countries regarded as forming a part of their spheres of influence. There were at least 10 cases of American intervention, starting with Cuba when the Platt amendment was adopted in the Senate which gave virtual control over Cuba to the U.S. as well as provided the framework for the lease of Guantánamo Bay. Other examples are Panama in 1903, Nicaragua in 1912, Haiti in 1915, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, Chile in 1973, etc. An example of the blatant exercise of power was the Anglo-French-Israeli joint attack on the Suez Canal zone in 1956. The Soviet Union used brute force to restore its domination of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. There was of course the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 which had a lot to do with the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire.

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the evolution of international law since then have completely changed the rules of the game of the exercise of power by the introduction of the concept of legitimacy. It is universally recognised that there are only two scenarios of the legitimate use of force: pursuant to the Security Council authorisation or in the exercise of the right of self-defence. The latter has been severely circumscribed by the Charter which lays down that the right of self-defence can be exercised only in response to an attack by another state, thus rejecting the “pre-emptive” right of self-defence.

The one case of unilateral use of force in the 21st century was the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 which the international community refused to recognise as legitimate since it did not have the imprimatur of Security Council approval nor was it accepted as having been in the exercise of the right of self-defence. United States/NATO intervention in Afghanistan, on the other hand, was sanctioned by the U.N.

Of the three constituent elements of “power” — military, economic and diplomatic — the economic is crucial. This is self-evident and does not need elaboration. One important reason why the Soviet Union lost the Cold War was the mismatch between its bloated military and the inability of its economy to support and sustain it.

Is there a “superpower” in the contemporary world?

The answer is clearly in the negative. America has global reach, and its military is no doubt the strongest in the world. But this does not confer on it the capability to impose its will on others. To be fair to it, the U.S. does not ask others to recognise it as a superpower, though it does not protest when the rest of the world describes it as one. The Americans would rather prefer to be recognised as the “exceptional” power. The capacity of its military as well as the will of its political leadership to deploy anywhere at any time without worrying about adverse political or diplomatic reaction remains, but it is severely hobbled by its increasing economic weakness.

To that extent, it is a global power. But it lacks in other attributes of power. The most embarrassing moment for American diplomacy was in March 2003 when it failed to persuade enough members of the Security Council, including some of its close allies, to support the “second resolution” on Iraq which would have legitimised its intervention in Iraq; only four countries promised support. More and more members in the U.N. vote in favour of the resolution criticising American sanctions against Cuba.

The U.S. has not had much success in getting countries such as India to fall in line with its Iran policy. Getting its nominee elected president of the World Bank has less to do with its diplomatic strength and more to do with the voting advantage that it and its allies enjoy as also to the lack of unity among the challengers for the job.

America is without doubt a super “soft” power. Its movies, television series, popular music, and, most of all, its espousal of democratic values have immense resonance among the youth of the world, especially in the Arab and Muslim world. But these do not translate into “power.”

China is portrayed as a legitimate claimant for the title of global power. China's economy has been the principal engine of growth of the world economy but is now slowing down and facing the prospect of a reality bubble, political instability and huge corruption scandals. It is now not clear when, if ever, it will become the biggest economy in the world. Its military capability is nowhere close to America's. In R&D and labour productivity, it is way behind the U.S. China has increased its military profile, especially its navy. But the neighbours, while distrustful, are not afraid of China because of the American “pivot” or other factors. Much weaker countries, such as the Philippines, refuse to be intimidated by Chinese threats.

If the U.S. and China can be eliminated as candidates for “superpower” status, there is no need to consider any other state for the position.

Is India at least a “regional” power?

The most conspicuous example of the exercise of power by India was the operation in 1971 in former East Pakistan. India's intervention was not authorised by the U.N.; India justified it on the ground of self-defence since Pakistan had earlier attacked several Indian Air Force bases as also on the one that Pakistan had in fact invaded India in the form of 10 million refugees. There is also the case of the intervention in the Seychelles in 1986, and one case of ill-advised military intervention, in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s which had disastrous consequences for India. There was talk of India sending a brigade to Iraq in 2003, but wiser counsel prevailed. As a general rule, Indian participation in military operations has been as a part of U.N.-mandated peace-keeping operations, with the exceptions mentioned.

The global powers of yesteryear became such for concrete reasons: control over sources of raw materials including oil and gas and protection of the interests of their corporations, e.g. the case of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 1950s, an American company in which the then CIA director was a shareholder.

Why do some analysts in India feel enamoured of the prospect of India being called a global or a regional power? Is it because of the sense of self-importance or prestige? Will such a “title” give India a place at the high table in international diplomacy?

Others sometimes use this adjective for us for one or both of these reasons: to flatter us — and we are the most flattery-prone people in the world — and/or to make us take foreign policy steps which would serve the objectives of those flattering us. Will the label of regional power help ameliorate the lives of the poor in our country, which is and should continue to be the guiding principle of our domestic as well as external policy? Further, while we have soft power of doubtful practical utility, we definitely are or have become or are becoming a super “soft state.” India's neighbours have the full measure of its will, or lack thereof, to use whatever hard power it has.

One criterion of military power ought to be, not the unlimited capacity to pay for imports of hardware, but how much of it is the country able to manufacture domestically; India fares poorly in this respect. The possession of nuclear weapons does not change anything. Pakistan too has them. And, our nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan from indulging in the Kargil adventure, but Pakistan's nuclear weapons apparently deterred us from crossing the Line of Control (LoC) at that time, and restrained us after 26/11.

The boom years of India's economy seem to be over at least for the short term. Our forex reserves have ceased to grow and are likely to dwindle, with the rising energy bill and diminished exports. A reduction in interest rates might at some stage induce NRIs to start pulling out their deposits as it happened in 1990-91. A declining economy makes for a poor case for acceptance as a “power” of any kind.

In today's world, the concepts of super or global or even regional power do not make sense. We should not waste our time or energy over this non-issue. Fortunately, the Indian government does not seem to be much preoccupied about such recognition.

Two neighbours, and dealing with them

CHINMAYA R. GHAREKHAN

Once praised for keeping aside the core issue to move ahead on other fronts, India-China ties can no longer be cited as a model for relations with Pakistan

When I worked in the Prime Minister’s Office of Indira Gandhi from 1981 to 1984, she told me that she could visualise a time in the future when India and Pakistan would have normal, even friendly, relations but she did not have the same hope for relations with China because, she said, it was essentially an expansionist power. How do recent events validate her instinct and analysis?

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is universally acknowledged that it is the military establishment which is most opposed to normalising relations with India; indeed, it appears to have a vested interest in keeping India-Pakistan relations tense. Friendly relations with India would seriously undermine the raison d’être for the inflated size of the armed forces. They would lose control over the security policy, over Afghan and Indian policy as well as control over nuclear arsenal. In other words, the military establishment would become an adjunct of the civilian government, thereby losing not only its pre-eminent position but also its self-cultivated image of being the only institution that can safeguard and save the people, in effect, from themselves. It might also lose at least a part of its economic empire. Thus, for the Pakistan military, it makes sense not to normalise relations with India.

Consensus for détente

On the other hand, going by the election manifestos of major political parties in Pakistan in the run-up to the May 11 elections, there seems to be a growing consensus among politicians for détente with India. Their manifestos not only did not contain anti-India rhetoric; they also indicated a willingness to promote peace with India. The party of incoming Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even went to the extent of declaring that it will open the transit route for trade between India, Afghanistan and beyond through Pakistan. Since winning the election convincingly, he has reiterated his desire to work for better relations with India, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has warmly reciprocated. Imran Khan’s party also spoke of progressive detente with India. This trend needs to be noted and welcomed in India. It suggests that the political mainstream might be ready to stand up to the military in case the latter came in the way of normalising relations with India. Whether it is able to do so will remain to be seen, but at least it has made public its intention to do so. Mr. Sharif has declared that he will be the ‘boss’ and that civilian supremacy will be asserted. If that happens, the possibility of normal relations between the two countries can certainly be entertained. Indians have a tendency to lurch from euphoria to hostility in reacting to developments in neighbouring countries. We need to wait and watch.

Does this mean that Pakistanis have finally accepted that India has no evil designs on their country and that they have nothing to fear from us? Opinion polls in Pakistan have suggested that India is not on the top of their list of most worrisome subjects. The realisation that the country is being torn from within by forces nurtured by their own agencies seems to have dawned on them. The business lobbies — and Mr. Sharif is a businessman — are certainly interested in opening trade and investment opportunities on a reciprocal basis. Pakistan has not kept the deadline of implementing the promised Most Favoured Nation status to India but one may expect this to happen in view of the declared intention of all parties to do so post-election. By and large, most people in Pakistan have reached the sensible conclusion that China, their all-weather friend, is not going to bail them out and that the best, perhaps the only, salvation for their fast-collapsing economy is to ride piggyback on India’s vast economy. The big question of how they tackle the terrorist outfits acting against India from Pakistani territory will remain.

Increasing aggression

China, by contrast, has become much more aggressive, and not just towards India. Having secured two decades of peaceful growth, China is now ready, it feels, to take on the world. Confirming this assertiveness are its actions in the South China Sea, Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and its unwillingness to discuss water issues with neighbours. China is more than willing to exploit its greatly enhanced clout in global economy to press its interests. It vigorously pursues its ambition to have the Yuan accepted as an alternative currency in international trade. It scored an important success by concluding a deal with Australia to trade directly using only the Yuan and the Australian dollar, bypassing the U.S. dollar.

As far as India-specific actions are concerned, there are any number of examples of China’s difficult attitude, as indicated by the deployment of several thousand PLA personnel in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and its intrusions across the Line of Actual Control. The most important indication of China’s true assessment of India’s importance for it is the suo moto statement of President Xi Jinping that the border problem will not be solved any time soon, making it clear that it certainly will not be resolved during his 10 years in office.

Hence, the reported statement by a Chinese official in Delhi that China would like to focus on reaching an agreement on the ‘framework’ for the settlement of the border issue needs to be noted. China will continue to make noise about the need for the two countries to cooperate in the international arena on issues such as climate change, but it remains firmly opposed to India’s aspiration for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (it would have been preferable for India not to have had any reference to this matter in the final declaration of the BRICS summit in South Africa than to have agreed to the most unpalatable formulation as finally agreed). This is what a Chinese scholar thought of India way back in 1903: “Indians have generally not cared if their territory is lost … Chinese determination is stronger than the Indian … we can foresee that Chinese accomplishments will certainly surpass those of the Indians.” Has anything changed?

The comparison with Pakistan and China brings out an interesting aspect. For many years, we in India had been asking Pakistan to follow the example of our relationship with China, in which both countries took a conscious decision to keep aside the core issue of border for the time being and concentrate on other aspects of bilateral relations that offered scope for cooperation to mutual benefit. Trade in particular was identified as offering a huge potential for expanding bilateral relations. This has happened, although the trade is heavily lopsided in China’s favour.

What is more, China is gobbling up our precious natural resources such as iron ore which we ought to be preserving for use in our own steel plants. It was the expectation at least on our part that increased economic relations would create conditions propitious for the two countries to deal seriously and pragmatically with the border problem. In this, we have been sadly mistaken.

Pakistan, on the other hand, insisted that there can be no progress on any of the bilateral issues so long as the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir was not resolved. It is premature to draw definitive conclusions, but about a year ago, Pakistan relented and agreed to move forward on trade before the core issue was settled. It agreed to grant India MFN status, apparently with the military’s consent, even in the absence of any progress on the Kashmir issue.

An interesting debate

What is the better approach? Settle the core issue first and then normalise, or normalise and then tackle the core issue? This is not just an academic question. Those arguing for the former would in effect suggest standstill in bilateral relations since the core issues are not going to be resolved, given the inflexible and politically difficult positions of all sides. Those in favour of the latter approach in effect would be reconciled to an indefinite status quo, since there would be no incentive to tackle the core issue. The debate needs to be joined.

11-08-2013

Directionless India

By Tavleen Singh

It is just as well that the latest crisis on the Line of Control left the triumvirate that heads the Indian government speechless as usual. If they had spoken, they may have made the Defence Minister seem like a statesman instead of the clown he has proved he is. Every time one or other of the triumvirate has spoken on a matter of grave national importance they have ended up proving that India is today frighteningly leaderless. Had Sonia Gandhi spoken to reporters she may have been asked questions about the wider implications of the recent attack in view of the impending changes in Afghanistan. She would not have had an answer. Had the Prime Minister spoken to the nation who knows what he might have said? Memories of Sharm el-Sheikh return. And, if the young prince had spoken he may have described Pakistan or even the LoC as 'a state of mind'.

By comparison, the Defence Minister's shilly-shallying between behaving like Pakistan's Defence Minister and then almost declaring war on Pakistan seems almost forgivable. He is not entirely to blame since surely he would have checked with senior officials like the National Security Advisor before making that first statement absolving the Pakistani army. Our problem is that it is beginning to seem more and more as if there is nobody at India's helm in a complex and scary time. Al-Qaeda has resurfaced everywhere. The American 'drawdown' from Afghanistan draws close and respect for jihadis in Pakistan has reached such levels that Hafiz Saeed led Eid prayers last week at the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore.

In case you have forgotten, this is the man we believe was the master planner of the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. This is the man who spends most of every interview he gives spewing venom against India and vowing to destroy the very idea of it. In case you have forgotten, it is now an established fact that not only was the Lashkar-e-Toiba responsible for the worst act of terrorism on Indian soil but it was ably assisted by the ISI. If only our Defence Minister had remembered this he would have hesitated to absolve the Pakistani army from involvement in the LoC attack.

Speaking of the 26/11 attack, may I remind you that despite all those promises of dealing resolutely with jihadi terrorism, nothing has actually happened except a lot of talk. So if the ISI thinks that it is a good time to organise another massacre in an Indian city, they would find it as easy to organise it as they did in 2008. The Indian government has taken none of the steps that the Americans took in their homeland after 9/11. Except for some token patrolling in Mumbai, nothing has really changed.

Nothing will change until the Indian government accepts at the highest levels of national security that we need to treat jihadi terrorism as war. If we had a real defence minister, instead of a man who got his job due to his loyalty to the Gandhi family, he would by now have put in place systems whereby the Army and civilian authorities could work together to fight this war. We would by now have had intelligence systems that really worked and police stations manned by policemen trained in counter-terrorism. As we approach the fifth anniversary of 26/11 it would be fair to say that not only have none of these things happened but senior members of the Congress party have made statements denying that Pakistan was behind the attack.

So when Shri A K Antony said that the LoC attack was by a group of 20 men who were accompanied by some people in Pakistani army uniform, he was really only continuing to sing the same tune. He may have taken his cue from that other Sonia loyalist in charge of national security, our Home Minister, who famously said when Chinese soldiers crossed into Ladakh that it was not serious. He made it sound as if it were no more than a game that both sides played just for fun.

The truth is that there is nothing funny about the games that the Chinese are playing in South Asia. They appear to be working in accordance with a definite strategy to weaken India, and who better to help them do this than their old and reliable ally on the other side of the LoC? And, what is India's strategy to counter theirs? Nobody knows. Every time there is a serious problem of national security, our senior ministers behave as ineffectually as amateur fighters in a boxing ring. Their antics always make India seem like an insignificant, pathetic little country instead of an aspiring regional power. What else can one say other than that the Government of India is no longer just an embarrassment to itself, it is an embarrassment to India.

23-08-2013

The Palk Bay catch

Sri Lanka’s latest position that it will prosecute Indian fishermen arrested for poaching instead of arranging for their early release is bound to cause alarm in Tamil Nadu, where over 100 families await the return of their kin from Sri Lankan jails. The country’s External Affairs Minister, G.L. Peiris, has clarified that the stress is not on detention, but deterrence; and that a fine, rather than a long jail term, could be equally effective. This may not be enough to address the disquiet in Tamil Nadu over their continued imprisonment. Chief Minister Jayalalithaa has repeatedly asked for India’s intervention, and the Union government has summoned the Sri Lankan High Commissioner and issued a démarche. Sri Lanka’s response has been to highlight the frequency, scale and unsustainable nature of poaching by Indian fishermen. It is understandable that Colombo believes imprisonment for just a few days is insufficient deterrence against repeated incursions and plunder of its marine resources. It is possible that diplomatic intervention may ultimately set free all those detained, but it will hardly be the end of the problem.

Routine crossings, arrests and release need not be the only way of dealing with this seemingly intractable problem. On the one hand, fishermen in Tamil Nadu believe Sri Lankan waters are their “traditional” fishing grounds, and on the other, their Tamil counterparts in northern Sri Lanka, eager to make full use of their post-war freedom to fish, understandably resent the repeated incursions of Indian fishers into their maritime territory. Any meeting ground between these two claims will have to come from the fishermen themselves. Any settlement they arrive at will have to be backed by appropriate government measures. It is in this context that New Delhi and Colombo must facilitate a fresh process of negotiations on how best the two sides could share the marine resources. The earlier such a process is begun the better for fishermen from both sides. Further, the bilateral Joint Working Group on Fisheries has not met for a long time and it is India’s turn to host it. A key priority will be to ensure that Tamil fishermen in northern Sri Lanka, who were robbed of their livelihood during the war years, be given a chance to reclaim their maritime resources. The available resources are insufficient to meet the competing demands of both sides, and some will have to look for alternative livelihoods. Instead of crying foul over routine arrests, the Tamil Nadu government must strengthen measures to wean its fishermen away from unsustainable fishing practices, encourage deep-sea fishing and come up with livelihood solutions for those left out.

25-08-2013

 Attacking Syria is a bad idea

As allegations fly thick and fast that the Syrian Army attacked a Damascus suburb with chemical weapons last week, the West seems once again on the verge of committing itself to another disastrous military adventure. Though opinion is still divided within the United States, all indications are that Washington is thinking of aerial bombardment along the lines of Nato’s 1999 attack on Yugoslavia, once again citing humanitarian compulsions to justify what would be an act of aggression. Before the international community evaluates and debates its options, however, surely it is essential that there be an independent investigation of the incident. Though the Bashar al-Assad regime possesses stocks of chemical weapons, earlier allegations of their use by the government have never been conclusively verified. Ironically, U.N. investigators arrived in Syria right before the attack in which chemical munitions were allegedly used; only a government looking to discredit itself would have timed their deployment in this manner. Did hotheads within the regime act recklessly, disregarding the obvious international consequences? Or has the opposition staged a provocation to tarnish the regime, as the Assad government and its allies like Iran believe? Damascus has said it will allow U.N. experts to visit the site of the alleged attack, a counter-intuitive offer if it really used chemical munitions there. The fact that Washington is not interested in on-the-ground forensics suggests the Obama administration has already made up its mind.

Whatever the case, the alleged use of WMDs in Syria must not be made a pretext for illegal intervention. There is no basis in international law for drawing “red lines” — as U.S. President Barack Obama has done — the crossing of which would permit the unilateral use of force without U.N. Security Council authorisation. Even if law and morality were on its side, western military strikes would still be a bad idea. As it is, the expectation that some messianic solution to the civil war will come from outside Syria’s borders — either from the West’s military might, or the money and arms pumped by regional powers — has made the armed opposition consistently oppose any proposal for a political settlement. Syria’s toxic environment, in which both the government and sections of the opposition have committed war crimes, cannot be cleaned up by the West’s firepower. Even if the U.S. and its allies were to succeed in destroying the Syrian state, as they did the Iraqi and Libyan ones before, an anarchic, partitioned Syria will radiate instability throughout West Asia. As he ponders his next move, Mr. Obama should be careful what he wishes for.

27-08-2013

A persisting confusion

The entire world has been waiting for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to articulate his government’s plan for dealing with the scourge of terrorism that has not just eaten into Pakistan’s vitals but remains a threat to other countries as well. It was hoped he would do so in a national address last week, his first after taking charge of the country in June. Disappointingly, Mr. Sharif seemed to have little to say that inspired hope. He accurately described terrorism as an existential threat to his country, but appeared confused on how to deal with it. He spoke in several voices, saying the government was prepared to do so by dialogue or through the use of force, ultimately suggesting that the best option was to talk with those who had chosen the path of violence. Pakistan’s new political leadership evidently remains under the illusion that the Taliban and the array of militant groups allied with them across the country can be persuaded to rejoin the national mainstream. Considering that these elements killed more Shia Muslims in Pakistan last year than at any other time before, tried their best to scupper this year’s elections by unleashing bloody violence, and declared they had no belief in democracy, the most charitable explanation for Mr. Sharif’s vaguely outlined half-plan is that it is naive. His cabinet’s defence committee, which includes the Service chiefs, subsequently decided that any talks would be conditional on the militants laying down arms. There is no word on what the plan is if these groups, as is most likely, refuse to disarm.

For one with a progressive vision of friendship with India, which too he reiterated in his speech, it is unfortunate that Mr. Sharif has been unable to bring similar clear-sightedness to his views on terrorism. Terror constitutes the single biggest threat today to peace between the two countries and the region. It is the groups raised by the Pakistani state for proxy battles in Afghanistan and India that are now striking terror within Pakistan. With his mandate and constituency, and his apparent determination to reset the civilian-military balance, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) leader is uniquely placed to convince his people that militant groups are certainly not part of God’s army. Certain sections in Pakistan may still harbour the illusion that some groups retain a strategic utility, but the country really has no alternative but to turn the lights off on them — all of them — decisively. Nor is there any time to lose in this task: the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is about a year away. By acting now, Pakistan can ensure that the consequences for itself and India will be better than current predictions.

Nuclear weapons, costs and myths

The question is whether nuclear weapons have made us more secure against potential adversaries.

We have not had a dispassionate debate in our country about nuclear weapons: whether they have really enhanced our security or merely made us feel good about ourselves, whether they have helped in reducing our dependence and expenditure on conventional weapons, or whether the various doctrines propounded mainly by Americans during the course of the Cold War, such as mutually assured destruction, first-strike capability, second-strike capability (the basis of our "nuclear doctrine"), etc are valid, or serve any useful purpose for us.

The nuclear jargon created by "strategic" thinkers in the West might have made sense at the time, but the situation is not reproducible in our region. America and the Soviet Union did not share a land boundary, did not have emotional territorial disputes and neither was thirsting to avenge military defeat. In our region, all these factors are present, and they throw doubt on the usefulness of atomic weapons. The most relevant one for the purpose of our discussion is the doctrine of second strike. It says that if Pakistan, for example, were to attack first with nuclear weapons, we would retain the capacity to absorb the shock and destruction, and to retaliate in second strike (since we would be the second one to strike) and inflict unacceptable damage on Pakistan — indeed, erase it altogether. Ergo, Pakistan will never dare attack India. But this theory has already been proved wrong.

The first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed about 1,20,000 people and destroyed more than half the city. If a bomb of similar destructive power were to be dropped on Delhi, the casualties would be 10 times greater, considering the density of population and the nature of the habitation. Are we seriously to believe that, in the wake of such massive destruction, the government, irrespective of its composition, could retain the cohesion, the nerve, the command and control chain, no matter how convincing it might look on paper, to actually launch a counter nuclear attack? Where is the guarantee that the initial strike by Pakistan would not destroy the governing structures and that there might not be anyone left to take and pass on the necessary orders? We would, of course, be able to retain many of our nukes, since they would have been dispersed across the country and some of them would be deployed underwater in submarines.

Our nuclear theorists would argue that that is precisely the point. Since both countries would realise that the other side would have saved some of its nukes from the initial strike by the other side, there would, in fact, be no nuclear exchange. In other words, nuclear weapons are meant never to be used; they are weapons of dissuasion or deterrence and are meant to guarantee that there would be a permanent no-war situation. Their only purpose is to deter any large-scale hostilities; if they have ever to be used, whatever the circumstances, the rationale for having them would have been disastrously defeated.

There is no way to prove or disprove the deterrent theory. But there are more examples of the deterrence theory not working ever since the nuclear era began. In a slim volume titled Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons, author Ward Wilson makes a most credible case to demolish the myth, nurtured by both the Americans and the Japanese for their respective reasons, that Hiroshima forced Japan to surrender unconditionally. Constraints of space do not permit elaboration of his argument, but his short point is that destruction, irrespective of its magnitude, does not cause defeat; it was not Hiroshima or Nagasaki but the Soviet declaration of war against Japan on August 8 that compelled Japan to surrender.

An interesting example of the failure of deterrence is the one most cited as its greatest success, namely, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October1962. John F. Kennedy knew that his actions might provoke the Soviets, at some stage, to use nuclear missiles. Yet he went ahead with the ultimatum. In other words, Kennedy did not let the probability of the Soviets launching their nuclear arsenal deter him. There is evidence that he did take that into consideration but went ahead nevertheless.

People might argue about the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis for our region, but the subcontinent offers a conclusive case against the doctrine of deterrence. Deterrence worked in our case for just over a year from 1998 to 1999. Pakistan indulged in the Kargil adventure without, it would appear, giving the slightest thought to the fact that India had nuclear weapons. Deterrence failed, utterly. If at all it worked, it is Pakistani nukes that restrained us from using our conventional superiority to drive away the invaders. We were deterred by Pakistan's nukes. We earned perhaps well meaning but meaningless appreciation for showing restraint, but in the process lost many of our young officers.

That is what deterrence has done in our case, removed the advantage that our conventional superiority gave us.

We do not yet have the military-industrial complexes that former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke about in the 1950s. But we do have a strong scientific community justly proud of its accomplishments in the nuclear and missile fields. The whole nation is proud of their achievements. Is it possible that it is our scientists who are the main drivers of our programmes in these areas? It is not unthinkable. If DRDO or DAE proposes some new project, it would be difficult for the government to deny it, since it would be accused of denying scientific progress, particularly if some other country develops similar weapons. This happens in all countries.

It might well be asked: why rake this up now? What is the point? We need this debate, keeping aside ethical issues, such as the morality of nuclear weapons. Citizens have to be educated and given an opportunity to air their views on a matter of this import. India and Pakistan and China have been busy building up their nuclear arsenals. Our doctrine speaks of "credible minimum deterrent". It is legitimate to ask how much is "minimum". Will it adversely affect our security if India and Pakistan were to declare a "freeze" on their respective stockpiles? We do not like to admit it, but the two countries are engaged in a nuclear and missile arms race.

While the probability of a major war with China is not great — given its leadership's need to keep the economy growing for reasons of survival — we cannot build our strategic policy on this assumption. The answer does not lie in nuclear deterrent. China will always be miles ahead of us in this area, as in most others. It has the potential to inflict immeasurably more death and destruction on us than we can on them. Deterrence is likely to work in China's favour. What is needed is a vastly enhanced conventional capability in terms of weapons systems, infrastructure, etc.

The answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this article can briefly be given as follows. Nuclear weapons have not really made us more secure against our potential adversaries. If anything, they have nullified the advantage of conventional superiority against Pakistan and put us on the defensive. Nor have they helped in reducing expenditure on conventional weapon systems, as shown by our immensely costly and continuous purchase of weapons systems from foreign vendors. The time has perhaps come to consider a freeze, even if it is only with reference to Pakistan.

This bilateral meanness

Poonch should not derail trade breakthrough. Trade should prevent Poonch.

In the first week of August, India reported a Pakistani intrusion across the Line of Control (LoC) into the Poonch district of India-administered Jammu and Kashmir, in which five Indian troops were killed after an ambush. The official Indian version said the intruders were wearing Pakistani uniforms, a palliative that made the intrusion "unofficial", but Indian army circles insisted the ambush was laid by "Pakistani troops along with a few heavily armed and highly trained militants".

Pakistan denied any such operation had taken place. Since then, the Indian army has shelled the Pakistani areas lying close to the LoC, giving rise to casualties. This in turn has caused the Pakistani side to shell a number of Indian posts. The bilateral meanness that haunts the LoC — which was "made safe" through a ceasefire agreement in 2003 — is back again. Barring a few sane voices on both sides, nationalism is tilting into battle-cries once again. Both states wear the warpaint anyway in August, because they won their independence in this month and immediately went to war in 1947 in Kashmir.

India saw protest demonstrations from people outraged by the "ambush", not all of them spontaneous. The media squared off on both sides. Greenhorn anchors in Pakistan's proliferating TV news channels vomited platitudes about the "baniya" wickedness of India; and politicians tilted into shameless populism on both sides. Senior Pakistan politician and leader of the Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam), Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, began his statement well by saying he smelled "milli bhagat" (collusion) between the two armies, but quickly recanted his rather innovative comment by adding that he would never accept the "supremacy" of India.

This year has seen a lot of bilateral meanness between the two nuclear-armed nations. In January, India accused the Pakistan army of sending killers across the LoC who beheaded Indian troops. The incident coincided with the powerful Defence of Pakistan Council (comprising non-state actors) demonstrations on the roads in Pakistan, shouting defiance of the PPP government's intention of awarding India the most favoured nation status. Then, India hanged a mid-level Kashmiri leader in May; Pakistan pleaded innocence when some "patriotic" prisoners retaliated by killing an Indian spy languishing in a Pakistani jail, supposedly secure, on death row. Indian prisoners did the same to a Pakistani prisoner on the other side.

It is difficult to say which side is meaner. But some variation in assessment can be seen in what the world believes. Internationally, Pakistan is seen as the revisionist power unrealistically trying to force the hand of the much stronger status quo state that is India. The 2008 attack in Mumbai by Pakistani non-state actors — one of whom was actually caught — damaged Pakistan's reputation further, painting it as a defiant country that refused to dig itself out of its military-induced jingoism. Most of the terrorists killing innocent Pakistanis and rendering Pakistan a failed state today are the old instruments of the army's "asymmetrical" war against India. Because their patron hopes to use them in some future time, they are surviving and have become powerful enough to break the state's "monopoly of violence", killing its police personnel like flies.

The Indian outrage is "original", after the event. As the lesser protagonist with the more intense "nationalism of the weaker state", Pakistan reacts to this outrage through denial of the event. In India, the media influences the state. In Pakistan, the media aligns itself with the response of the revisionist state. The Pakistani media outrage is "reactive", therefore "derivative". Since the "event" has not taken place in Pakistan, the media must create a "cause", and for that it goes back to the national narrative, buried at times under initiatives taken by popularly elected leaders to normalise relations with India. What is the national narrative?

The cardinal tenet of the Pakistani narrative is that India never accepted the formation of Pakistan and is currently involved in destroying it: the very existence of Pakistan is somehow a negation of India. Indian prime ministers, from Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Manmohan Singh, may come swearing acceptance of Pakistan, they can't budge the narrative. All Pakistani media embraces the view — so far without credible proof — that India is interfering in Balochistan to an extent that should arouse international concern. More outrageously, police officials and semi-literate TV anchors claim that the Taliban who kill Pakistanis are funded and trained by India.

After the latest flare-up, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will have to tone down his rhetoric of normalising ties with India through free trade and connectivity. A comment from his interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, who is known to interface with the army, is deprecating enough about India to be accepted as a switch of signal. Before the "alleged" Poonch ambush, a retired senior air force officer was explaining on TV why he was opposed to free trade with India. He thought Pakistan was too embroiled in terrorism to trade successfully with its neighbour. His simplistic mind, of a piece with most retired khaki analysts and apparently civilian think tanks in Islamabad, erected a self-defeating "trading principle" that may apply equally to China, the US and EU.

The theorem in Pakistan is absurdly posited like this: don't move towards normalisation because border incidents make normalisation look like capitulation. What it rejects is the universal principle that conflict which cannot be resolved should be tackled through normalisation: Poonch should not derail trade breakthrough; trade breakthrough should prevent Poonch. The theorem presumes the possession of some kind of trump card that India is dying to defuse. Pakistan doesn't hold any trump cards, unless more conflict is one. One of the latest analyses says once the Americans leave, the Pakistan army will demob from the western border and concentrate again on the eastern one to face up to its more permanent challenges.

Looking at the bright side in this LoC confrontation, both sides want to move to "peace talks", which keep getting bogged down. But here, too, "peace talks" in Pakistan are mostly interpreted to mean getting India to decide all the bilateral disputes in favour of Pakistan. In India, "peace talks" mean moving on from the perennial bilateral stalemate to "normal" conduct through free trade, investment and a liberal visa regime. (The world agrees with the latter position, which has, over time, convinced two elected Pakistani governments in succession since 2008.)

The media war between India and Pakistan ends up hurting the governments in power by curtailing their efforts to pry their policies out of the rut of the national narrative. The Pakistani media war against India destabilises Pakistan by modifying the categories of "friends" and "enemies" inside the country. After the 2008 Mumbai attack, the PPP was tagged as enemy because President Zardari had tried to disarm India by forgoing Pakistan's doctrine of nuclear first-use. In 2013, Prime Minister Sharif runs the risk of attracting the same kind of aspersion. In consequence, Pakistan will end up damaging India much less than it damages itself.

There was, however, one special moment in Pakistan. On August 6, TV anchor Hamid Mir got French and German ambassadors to talk about how two sworn enemies finally became normally-behaving states. The French ambassador said: "France and Germany fought two wars due to their different thinking and ideas. But they have learnt a good lesson from their bitter past. The youth of France and Germany have played a vital role to bridge the gaps between the two countries. Both countries exchanged six million youth, who got education in each other's country. The Elysee Treaty of 1963 brought the two rivals closer for progress and prosperity."