Economy

Tax administration, heal thyself

Tax rate increases are in the air, especially since all of us have read about the fiscal cliff in the US, the 99 per cent vs 1 per cent fashion, President Hollande of France (an economy closest to us in its non-economic and Luddite views) proposing prohibitive tax rates on the rich, etc.

C. Rangarajan, advisor to the prime minister, stated, appropriately on Financial Inclusion day, that "one need not disturb the structure of income tax system as it is now. But add a surcharge for income above [a] particular level. I believe as we go along, we need to raise more revenues and the people with larger incomes must be willing to contribute more".

Note the populist appeal to the super-rich. They should be willing — or else, off with their heads (income). As discussed in my earlier article, Taxing the rich and other fantasies (IE, January 23), there is precious little evidence to support Rangarajan's recommendation. What the data do suggest, as documented extensively below, is that the reason tax revenue is considerably below potential is because the middle income group, those earning between Rs 5 to Rs 10 lakh, is quite "unwilling" to pay taxes, even at an average tax rate of 10 per cent! And that the most "willing" are the super-rich, those earning above Rs 20 lakh a year. The raise tax rates recommendation should be junked, especially since stable tax rates have generated "good" tax revenue and allowed compliance to increase more than threefold from the abysmally low levels which prevailed prior to the 1997-98 budget.

Until 2005-06, India, via CAG reports on the ministry of finance, had access to data, some data, on the distribution of income and taxation. After that — whoosh — all the information stopped. Now the reports only reveal the total number of taxpayers in the economy, about 3.24 crore, out of which about 1 crore file tax returns but don't pay any tax because their incomes are below Rs 1.8 lakh.

What the tax department, and all of us, should be interested in is maximising tax revenue. The table reports all the relevant tax parameters for fiscal 2011-12 — who pays taxes, who should pay taxes, rates of taxation, revenue collected, etc.

Some suggestive conclusions:

The total amount of personal income tax (PIT) that could have been collected in 2011-12 was Rs 517,000 crore or Rs 5.17 trillion. The total amount that was collected was Rs 1.72 trillion indicating an overall compliance rate of 33 per cent. So two-thirds of the taxable population avoided paying taxes altogether or paid two-thirds less taxes than they should have.

The dominantly large share of the flow of black money each year is indicated by the gap in tax collected and tax due and for 2011-12 this gap, Rs 3.45 trillion, is about 4 per cent of GDP. For the 10 years 2002-03 to 2011-12, 4 per cent of average GDP is Rs 20 trillion. This suggests that the recent estimates pegging black money at around Rs 25 trillion are in the right ballpark — and that our "missing tax" estimates are broadly correct.

The largest share of missing taxes is among those earning between Rs 5 to Rs 10 lakh a year. They are in the top 7 per cent of the population, they number around 25 million, and only about 10 per cent of such individuals pay any tax. How much missing taxes is in this group, a group for which the average tax rate is only 10 per cent? About equal to the entire tax collected in 2011-12: Rs 150 thousand crore.

About Rs 1 trillion is lost among those earning between Rs 10 and Rs 20 lakh a year. Such individuals are in the top 2 per cent of the population, and only a third of such individuals pay any tax.

The super-rich or those earning more than Rs 20 lakh a year: there were 88 lakh such individuals and 58 lakh paid taxes, yielding a compliance rate of 66 per cent. Missing taxes for this group: Rs 0.46 trillion, or only 13 per cent of the entire amount of PIT missing in India.

If compliance levels stay the same, a surcharge of 3 per cent on super-rich incomes will yield about Rs 2,600 crore. Alternatively, the government could make an effort, with support from its tax administration officials, to reduce corruption, reduce black money, and increase taxation of the top 7 per cent. If compliance in this group was brought to only the average of the economy — that is, 30 per cent — that alone would generate an extra Rs 35,000 crore, that is, five million extra taxpayers, paying an average tax rate of only 10 per cent, on average incomes of Rs 7 lakh. Okay, if tax administration increased compliance by only 3 percentage points, from 10 per cent to 13 per cent among this middle income group of Rs 5 to Rs 10 lakh, the extra revenue gained would be Rs 5,250 crore or double that gained from putting a 3 per cent surcharge on the super-rich.

These simple calculations yield at least three recommendations. First, it should be mandatory for the finance ministry to release data on tax compliance by income groups — a practice common in most economies in the world. Surely, no one can oppose the release of this statistic, so why isn't it being practised? Possibly because it will cast a very black shadow on the workings of the tax administration in India? Second, the biggest revenue gainer is via an increase in compliance, especially for the middle income group. Third, stop thinking of populist measures like surcharges on the super rich, or copy French measures like increasing tax rates for anybody. If any such measures are introduced in the budget, it would not be a "responsible" budget as the finance minister has promised — and not responsible by a long shot.

19-08-2013

The needless battle

Rupee defence strategy has deepened the gathering gloom on the India growth story.

The defence of the rupee is going horribly wrong. It has damaged two sources of hope for a growth pick-up in India — monetary policy easing and India's commitment to economic reform. When Chairman Ben Bernanke of the Fed talked about tapering quantitative easing in the US, it was expected that there would be pressure on emerging market currencies. Countries with weaker economies, and with larger current account deficits were likely to see more currency volatility. Instead of talking about this source of pressure, which all emerging markets faced when the dollar started appreciating, the government decided to step in to defend the rupee.

Evidence from across the world shows that a currency defence often fails. Every government trying to stabilise a currency is, therefore, fully aware of the chances of failure. A careful cost-benefit analysis of its strategy is thus an important pre-condition to initiating a defence. Since the global currency turmoil started, the government has been rolling out measures such as currency market controls, import duties on gold and silver, bans on purchase of gold coins and tightening of capital controls to stabilise the rupee. These dirigiste solutions seem oblivious of their likely impact on market expectations. They are based on central planning notions of bans and restrictions being the solutions to the economy's problems.

First came restrictions on currency derivatives markets by Sebi and the RBI. These markets inform people of expectations about the currency. This information may be unpleasant. The government may disagree with it. But instead of listening to what the market was saying, the authorities chose to try to silence it. Restrictions reduced the extent to which people could hedge their currency risk. This was a bad move, especially since the rupee was expected to become more volatile. It made investors less willing to buy rupee assets. Trading volumes on domestic currency derivatives markets fell sharply and the cost of hedging increased. Instead of making rupee assets more attractive, these measures have made them less attractive. Further, the restrictions have undermined the market's confidence about the government's commitment to financial market liberalisation.

Next came the liquidity squeeze and an increase in short-term interest rates. The complicated strategy hoped to keep long-term interest rates low. This, too, failed. When the rate hike saw a transmission of higher rates to treasury bill rates, long-term bond yields and deposit rates, it became increasingly clear that sooner or later bank lending rates would go up. To prevent that, the RBI kept the repo and CRR rate unchanged. This left the market in complete confusion. Were interest rates going to rise or fall? Statements by the authorities that the tightening was temporary till the rupee stabilises provided little comfort. Could the currency stabilise before US monetary policy went back to normal? How long was "temporary"? In an environment in which a monetary easing was expected to help push up growth, this sudden tightening was a shock. Interest rates are still high. The measures have undermined confidence about monetary policy easing.

After the liquidity squeeze failed to restore rupee stability, came tariff hikes and restrictions on gold and silver imports and tightening of capital controls under FEMA. Restrictions have been imposed on capital outflows by firms and households. Already, firms were suffering from the difficulties of the policy environment. If some of them were going to stay healthy by investing abroad, that was made more cumbersome. Hardly any money was going out by individuals investing abroad. But putting a restriction on these trickles sent out a bad signal to an already nervous market. These measures did not inspire confidence that the government's focus was investment and growth. Worse, they suggested that India's economic reforms are not deep-seated and can be reversed for short-term ends.

With the opening up of trade and the capital account, the currency market has grown very large. Old solutions, like selling a few billion dollars from our reserves to prevent appreciation, no longer work. Out of the three corners of the impossible trinity, a country can choose only two. For the last two decades, India had chosen to move towards an open economy and a flexible exchange rate. In the face of the QE tapering, it means choosing between rupee stability and lowering interest rates. But the government did not like having to make the choice. It wanted both. The only way to control the currency in such a situation is to close the economy. When the size of the market has shrunk adequately, the RBI can intervene and prevent depreciation without much loss of reserves.

If the rupee remains volatile, the government has to choose to either roll out the next measure it has on its list, or to find an exit route. FEMA allows the RBI and government to shut off all cross-border transactions for sale and purchase of assets. The market believes that as long at the rupee defence strategy remains in place, the authorities might impose restrictions on various other capital flows. This expectation has caused further gloom.

We should not lose sight of the big picture of Indian economic policy. The story of the last 20 years is one of slow but steady economic reform resulting in 7 per cent trend GDP growth. The day we walk away from the promise of slow but steady reform, the expectation of future productivity growth is shattered. This adversely affects the credit rating of India, stock prices, investment in India by locals and by foreigners, and capital flight from India. The needless battle the government has picked on the rupee, and the measures it has taken, have reinforced the already growing despondence about economic reforms. It has raised new questions on the India growth story. The government must immediately undo all the steps that have reversed economic reforms of trade or finance or capital account liberalisation. Otherwise, we will suffer deeper damage to the prospect of high GDP growth